WILLE proti Lichtenštejnsku



AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 28396/95

by Herbert Wille

against Liechtenstein

The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

27 May 1997, the following members being present:

Mr. S. TRECHSEL, President

Mrs. G.H. THUNE

Mrs. J. LIDDY

MM. G. JÖRUNDSSON

A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

A. WEITZEL

H. DANELIUS

F. MARTINEZ

L. LOUCAIDES

M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

B. CONFORTI

N. BRATZA

J. MUCHA

A. PERENIC

P. LORENZEN

K. HERNDL

E.A. ALKEMA

M. VILA AMIGÓ

Mrs. M. HION

Mr. A. ARABADJIEV

Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 25 August 1995 by

Herbert WILLE against Liechtenstein and registered on 31 August 1995

under file No. 28396/95;

Having regard to :

- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of

the Commission;

- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on

2 June 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the

applicant on 11 September 1996;

- the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 27 May 1997;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

FACTS

The applicant, born in 1944, is a national of Liechtenstein and

resident in Balzers, Liechtenstein. When lodging his application, the

applicant, a former member of the Liechtenstein Government, held the

office of President of the Liechtenstein Administrative Court

(Verwaltungsbeschwerde-Instanz). In the proceedings before the

Commission, he is represented by Mr. A. Kley-Struller, a lawyer

practising in St. Gallen, Switzerland, and by Mr. W.E. Seeger, a lawyer

practising in Schaan, Liechtenstein.

A. Particular circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

In 1992 a controversy arose between His Serene Highness Prince

Hans-Adam II and the Liechtenstein Government on political competences

in connection with the plebiscite on the question of Liechtenstein's

accession to the European Economic Space. At the relevant time, the

applicant was member of the Liechtenstein Government. Following an

argument between the Prince and members of the Government at a meeting

on 28 October 1992, the matter was settled on the basis of a common

declaration by the Prince, the Diet (Landtag) and the Government.

On 16 February 1995, in the context of a series of lectures on

questions of constitutional jurisdiction and fundamental rights, the

applicant gave a public lecture at the Liechtenstein-Institut, a

research institute, on the "Nature and Functions of the Liechtenstein

Constitutional Court" ("Wesen und Aufgaben des Staatsgerichtshofes").

In the course of the lecture, the applicant expressed the view that the

Constitutional Court was competent to decide on the "interpretation of

the Constitution in case of disagreement between the Prince

(Government) and the Diet" ("Entscheidung über die Auslegung der

Verfassung bei einem Auslegungsstreit zwischen Fürst (Regierung) und

Landtag").

On 17 February 1995 the newspaper "Liechtensteiner Volksblatt"

published an article on the lecture given by the applicant, mentioning

inter alia his views on the competence of the Constitutional Court.

On 27 February 1995 the Prince addressed a letter to the

applicant concerning the above lecture, as summarised in the article

published in the "Liechtensteiner Volksblatt".

In his letter, the Prince noted the views expressed by the

applicant on the competences of the Constitutional Court, in particular

on its competence to decide on the "interpretation of the Constitution

in case of disagreement between the Prince and the people"

("Interpretationsgerichtshof bei unterschiedlichen Auffassungen

zwischen Fürst und Volk"). The Prince recalled the political

controversy of 1992 and that, at the meeting of 28 October 1992, the

applicant had stated that he disagreed with parts of the Constitution

and therefore did not to feel bound by the Constitution.

The Prince continued that, having regard to the report in the

"Liechtensteiner Volksblatt", he had reason to believe that the

applicant still did not consider himself bound by the Constitution and

expressed views which clearly infringed the Constitution. The relevant

provisions of the Constitution could not be understood as granting the

Constitutional Court the competence to decide, as a court of

interpretation, in case of a disagreement between the Prince and the

people (Diet). The Prince concluded that, in his view, the applicant's

attitude towards the Constitution made him unsuitable for public

office. While not intending to get involved in a long public or

private debate with the applicant, the Prince wished to inform him in

good time that he would not appoint him again to a public office,

should he be proposed by the Diet or any other body. The Prince

finally expressed the hope that the applicant, for the remainder of his

term of office as President of the Administrative Court, would abide

by the Constitution and the laws.

By letter of 9 March 1995 the applicant informed the President

of the Diet about the letter of 27 February 1995. He denied having

ever made a statement to the effect that he did not consider himself

bound by the Constitution or parts thereof. He further explained his

research on the competences of the Constitutional Court in

constitutional matters. According to him, the expression of an opinion

not shared by the Prince could not be regarded as failure to comply

with the Constitution. However, taking into account the conclusions

drawn by the Prince in the said letter, his office as President of the

Administrative Court was called into question. The President of the

Diet subsequently informed the applicant that the Diet had discussed

the matter in camera and had unanimously come to the conclusion that

the applicant's office was not called into question on account of his

legal opinions as stated in the context of his lecture.

On 20 March 1995 the applicant replied to the letter sent by the

Prince on 27 February 1995, and enclosed a copy of his letter to the

President of the Diet. He explained in particular that it was his

conviction as a lawyer that his statements on the occasion of the

lecture of 16 February 1995, namely that the Constitutional Court was

competent to decide on the interpretation of the Constitution in case

of dispute between the Prince and the people (Diet), were correct and

did not infringe the Constitution. The applicant concluded that the

declaration made by the Prince that he did not intend to appoint the

applicant to a public office amounted to an interference with his

rights to freedom of opinion and to freedom of science, as guaranteed

under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.

It further called the constitutional right to equal access to public

office into question and constituted an attempt to interfere with

judicial independence.

In his letter in reply dated 4 April 1995, the Prince noted that

the applicant had distributed the letter of 27 February 1995 to a large

group of persons. The Prince stated that it had been his intention to

avoid a public discussion in informing the applicant, in a personal

letter, about his decision as early as possible. He considered that

a long debate between them on the question of the applicant's

qualification for the office as judge was inappropriate, as the

applicant had remained in office and his criticism had not been

directed at the decisions of the Administrative Court, but against the

applicant's general attitude towards the Constitution.

The Prince added that it was left to his discretion whether or

not to appoint a candidate for public office and that he was not

obliged to give any reasons for such a decision. However, as he had

known the applicant for many years he had considered it appropriate to

state the reasons for his decision regarding the applicant. Moreover,

his decision no longer to appoint the applicant, on account of his

attitude in the past as well as the opinion expressed by him, for the

office of President of one of the highest Courts did not amount to an

interference with the applicant's rights to freedom of expression and

to freedom of science. All citizens were free to propose and to plead

for amendments to constitutional or other legal provisions. However,

the applicant, during his term of office as member of the Government

and in his lecture, had not availed himself of such constitutional and

democratic means, but had simply ignored those parts of the

Constitution with which he disagreed.

The Prince further explained that the relevant constitutional

provision, namely Article 112 of the Constitution, concerned the

competence of the Constitutional Court to decide on the interpretation

of the Constitution in case of dispute between the Government and the

Diet. Confusing the terms 'Government' and 'Diet' with 'Prince' or

'people', as done by the applicant, would undermine the rule of law.

As Head of State, he was obliged to safeguard the constitutional order

and the democratic rights of the people. He would fail to observe his

duties if he were to appoint to one of the highest judicial offices a

person whom, owing to his attitude and the statements he had made, he

had to regard as not being committed to upholding the Constitution.

On 14 April 1997 the Liechtenstein Diet decided to nominate the

applicant again as President of the Administrative Court. By letter

of 17 April 1997, addressed to the President of the Diet, the Prince

did not accept the proposed appointment.

B. Relevant domestic law

The Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional, hereditary

monarchy upon democratic and parliamentary basis; the power of the

State is inherent in and emanates from the Prince and the people and

shall be exercised by both of them in accordance with the provisions

of the Constitution (Article 2 of the Constitution).

Chapter II of the Constitution is entitled "The Prince". In its

Article 7, it stipulates that the Prince is the head of the State and

exercises his sovereign authority in conformity with the provisions of

the Constitution and of the other laws; and that his person is sacred

and inviolable. Further competences are laid down in Articles 8 to 13.

According to Article 11, the Prince appoints the State officials, in

conformity with the provisions of the Constitution (cf., Article 79

concerning the Head of the Government, the Government Councillors and

their substitutes; Article 97 concerning the President of the

Administrative Court and his deputy; Article 99, in conjunction with

the Court Organisation Act, concerning the first instance judges;

Article 102 para. 3 concerning the members of the High Court and the

Supreme Court of Justice). By letter of 28 April 1997, the Prince

informed the Liechtenstein Government that he charged them to exercise

within their competence the appointment of State officials in 1997,

which, pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, have to be appointed

by the Prince.

Chapter IV of the Constitution contains the general rights and

obligations of citizens of the Principality. Article 31 stipulates the

equality of all citizens before the law, and also provides that the

public offices are equally open to them, subject to observance of the

legal regulations.

Pursuant to Article 97 of the Constitution, all decisions or

orders by the Government are subject to appeal before the

Administrative Court. The Administrative Court consists of a president

trained in the law, who is appointed by the Prince on the proposal of

the Diet, of his deputy, and of four appeal judges and their

substitutes elected by the Diet. The president and his deputy must be

nationals of Liechtenstein. Their term of office coincides with that

of the Diet, and ends at such a time as they are replaced.

According to Article 104 of the Constitution, the Constitutional

Court is, inter alia, competent to protect rights accorded by the

Constitution. S. 23 of the Constitutional Court Act (Staats-

gerichtshofgesetz) provides that decisions of a court or of an

administrative authority may be challenged before the Constitutional

Court, alleging that there has been an infringement of constitutional

rights or of rights guaranteed under the European Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains under Article 10 of the Convention that

the Prince, having regard to the information contained in his letter

of 27 February 1995 and further explained in his letter of

4 April 1995, violated his right to freedom of expression. In this

respect the applicant submits that the decision taken by the Prince,

namely not to appoint him for any public office, amounts to a sanction

for statements in the course of the applicant's lecture on

16 February 1995. According to the applicant, this interference cannot

be justified under Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention.

2. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the

Convention that he has no access to a tribunal to defend his reputation

and seek protection of his personal rights, including his occupation

and professional career, against the statements by the Prince. In this

respect, the applicant also invokes, as a subsidiary means, Article 13,

taken in conjunction with Article 10, of the Convention.

3. Moreover, the applicant considers that, because of his opinion

regarding a particular legal issue, he is prejudiced in his access to

any public office. He relies on Article 14, taken in conjunction with

Article 10, of the Convention.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The application was introduced on 25 August and registered on

31 August 1995.

On 26 January 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the

application to the respondent Government.

The Government's written observations were submitted on

2 June 1996. The applicant replied on 11 September 1996.

On 3 December 1996 the Commission decided to invite the parties

to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.

The applicant filed supplementary observations on 12 May 1997,

and the Government on 15 May 1997.

The hearing took place on 27 May 1997. The applicant attended

the hearing in person and was assisted by Mr. A. Kley-Struller and

Mr. W.E. Seeger as advisers. The respondent Government were

represented by Mr. N. Marxer, Head of the Legal Division of the

respondent Government, Mr. H. Golsong, Attorney, as Acting Agent,

Mr. T. Stein, Professor at Saarbrücken University, and Mr. M. Walker,

Attorney, as Counsels.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains about a breach of his right to freedom

of expression, as guaranteed under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the

Convention.

Article 10 (Art. 10), as far as relevant, provides as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This

right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and

impart information and ideas without interference by public

authority and regardless of frontiers. ...

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it

duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,

conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law

and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of

national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for

the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health

or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of

others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in

confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of

the judiciary."

a. The Government submit that the announcement made by the Prince

with respect to his refusal to nominate the applicant to a public

office for which the Prince has the power of nomination was a private

communication to him and did not constitute an exercise of

"jurisdiction" of the Principality within the meaning of Article 1

(Art. 1) of the Convention. They explain that the Liechtenstein

Constitution combines elements of monarchy and elements of democracy.

Thus, the sovereignty of the Principality arises out of two equal

sources: the Prince and the People. The relationship between these two

sources of sovereignty is, compared to other constitutional systems in

Europe, sui generis. Insofar as the Prince has the power to engage in

a sovereign act, his action requires the countersignature of the Head

of the Government in order to make it legally binding. In the present

case, there was no such countersignature. The Government also note

that under the Liechtenstein constitutional system, the Prince may,

without giving reasons, refuse to appoint a person to public office by

formal rejection or inaction, and that any such veto is not subject to

review.

The applicant submits that the decision of the Prince not to

appoint him to public office was not taken in a private capacity, but

in the exercise of constitutional powers of the Prince.

The Commission recalls that the responsibility of a State under

the Convention may arise for acts of all its organs, agents and

servants. As in connection with international law generally, the acts

of persons acting in an official capacity are imputed to the State.

In particular, the obligations of a Contracting Party under the

Convention can be violated by a person exercising an official function

vested in him, even where his acts are performed without express

authorisation and even outside or against instructions (cf. Ireland v.

the United Kingdom, Comm. Report 25.1.76, Yearbook 19, p. 512, at 758).

The Commission notes at the outset that the Principality of

Liechtenstein is a constitutional, hereditary monarchy upon democratic

and parliamentary basis; the power of the State is inherent in and

emanates from the Prince and the people and shall be exercised by both

of them in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution

(Article 2 of the Constitution). Chapter II of the Constitution

specifies various sovereign powers of the Prince, inter alia, the

appointment of the State officials (Article 11 of the Constitution).

In the present case, on 27 February 1995 the Prince addressed a

letter to the applicant concerning the public lecture given by the

applicant on 16 February 1995. In his letter, the Prince disagreed

with the views expressed by the applicant in his lecture, in particular

as far as the competences of the Constitutional Court were concerned.

He further announced his decision that he would not appoint the

applicant to public office in future. He confirmed his position in his

second letter of 4 April 1995, and he in fact refused to appoint the

applicant for a further term of office as President of the

Administrative Court, when proposed by the Liechtenstein Diet in

April 1997.

The Commission, having regard to the terms of the letter of

27 February 1995, considers that the Prince had come to a resolution

regarding his future conduct towards the applicant, which related to

the exercise of one of his sovereign powers, i.e. his power to appoint

State officials. The said letter was also expressly addressed to the

applicant as then President of the Administrative Court, though sent

to his place of residence. Having regard to all circumstances, the

Commission finds that the decision taken by the Prince not to appoint

the applicant to public office in future, as announced in the above

letter, constitutes a sovereign act imputable to the Principality of

Liechtenstein.

It follows that the applicant's complaint cannot be regarded as

incompatible, ratione personae, with the provisions of the Convention.

b. The Government, referring to the Court's case-law, consider that

Article 10 (Art. 10) does not apply when the central issue - as in the

instant case - is a question of access to public office.

According to the applicant, the decision complained of was taken

outside a specific appointment procedure and did not, therefore, raise

an issue of access to the civil service. Rather, the Prince's general

refusal to appoint him again to public office, irrespective of his

personal capabilities, was a ban from his profession and the direct

consequence of his statements made in the course of the lecture at the

Liechtenstein Institute.

The Commission recalls that the right of access to the civil

service was deliberately omitted from the Convention. Consequently,

the refusal to appoint a person as a civil servant cannot as such

provide the basis for a complaint under the Convention. This does not

mean, however, that in other respects civil servants fall outside the

scope of the Convention. In Articles 1 and 14 (Art. 1, 14), the

Convention stipulates that "everyone within [the] jurisdiction" of the

Contracting States must enjoy the rights and freedoms in Section I

"without discrimination on any ground" (cf. Eur. Court HR, Glasenapp

and Kosiek v. Germany judgments of 28 August 1986, Series A nos. 104,

p. 26, para. 49, and 105, p. 20, para. 35; Vogt v. Germany judgment of

26 September 1995, Series A no. 323, p. 22, para. 43).

The present case relates to the applicant's complaint under

Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention that, on account of the views

expressed by him in the course of a public lecture at the

Liechtenstein-Institut on issues of constitutional law, the Prince, as

announced in his letter of 27 February 1995, decided not appoint the

applicant to public office in future.

Such a complaint does not fall "clearly outside the provisions

of the Convention" (cf., mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Glasenapp and

Kosiek v. Germany judgments, op. cit., p. 23, para. 41, and p. 19,

para. 32). The fact that the right of access to or continued

employment in the public service is not one of the rights or freedoms

guaranteed by the Convention and its Protocols cannot restrict the

scope of operation and the protection of these instruments in respect

of rights which they do guarantee, and cannot prevent the Commission

from investigating whether the acts complained of amounted to a

violation with the applicant's rights guaranteed by Article 10 para. 1

(Art. 10-1) (No. 9228/80, Dec. 16.12.82, D.R. 30, p. 132; No. 9704/82,

Dec. 16.12.82, D.R. 30, p. 243).

It follows that the applicant's complaint cannot be regarded as

incompatible, ratione materiae, with the provisions of the Convention

and in particular with Article 10 (Art. 10) thereof.

c. The Government also maintain that the applicant failed to comply

with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention as he failed to avail

himself of any domestic remedy.

The Government consider in particular that, pursuant to

Article 104 of the Constitution and S. 23 para. 1 of the Constitutional

Court Act, the Constitutional Court is competent to examine complaints

about a judicial decision or about a decision taken by an

administrative authority, alleging an infringement of the rights

guaranteed by the Convention. They submit that the Constitutional

Court may decide questions of its own jurisdiction. In their view,

even if the Prince were not expressly mentioned in these provisions,

the question of the Constitutional Court's competence was open and it

was, therefore, mandatory for the applicant to attempt first to seek

redress in the Constitutional Court. In this respect, the Government

refer to a Constitutional Court decision of 21 June 1993 where judicial

review of a practice of the Prince was exercised.

In the submission of the Government, mere doubts as to the

prospects of success of these proceedings could not absolve the

applicant from his obligation to exhaust the domestic remedies, or to

try to exhaust them. In this context, the Government emphasize that

not only the case-law of the Convention organs determines the scope and

content of Article 26 (Art. 26) which refers to the "generally

recognised rules of international law". Accordingly, in the

interpretation of Article 26 (Art. 26), regard must also be had to

judgments of the International Court of Justice inasmuch as they stand

for general principles of international law. However, in the case-law

of the Hague Court a contention that the rule as to the exhaustion of

local remedies does not apply in a particular case because the domestic

law affords no means of redress could only be accepted if it had been

clearly shown that the local courts had no jurisdiction. In this

respect, the Government rely on the judgment of the Permanent Court of

International Justice in the Panavezys-Saldutiskis Railways case of

1938 (Series A/B no. 76).

The applicant submits that he did not fail to fulfil the

obligation to exhaust all domestic remedies, as required by Article 26

(Art. 26) of the Convention. He considers that the remedy indicated

by the Government was not sufficiently certain, in practice as well as

in theory. He also specifies that the Constitutional Court decision

referred to by the Government was taken in the context of proceedings

with a view to challenging an election, a remedy provided for under the

Liechtenstein Electoral Act.

Under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the Commission may

only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been

exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international

law.

The Commission recalls that the supervision machinery set up by

the Convention is subsidiary to the national human rights protection

systems. That principle is reflected in the rule set forth in

Article 26 (Art. 26), which "dispenses States from answering before an

international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity

to put matters right through their own legal system" (cf. Eur. Court

HR, Sadik v. Greece judgment of 15 November 1996, para. 30, to be

published in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996, with reference

to the De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium judgment of 18 June 1971,

Series A no. 12, p. 29, para. 50).

Under Article 26 (Art. 26) normal recourse should be had by an

applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford

redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of the

remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory

but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite

accessibility and effectiveness (cf. Eur. Court HR, Akdivar v. Turkey

judgment of 16 September 1996, paras. 66, 67, to be published in

Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996).

In the area of the exhaustion of domestic remedies there is a

distribution of the burden of proof. It is incumbent on the Government

claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an

effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time,

that is to say, that it was accessible, was one which was capable of

providing redress in respect of the applicant's complaints and offered

reasonable prospects of success. However, once this burden of proof

has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that the

remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some

reason inadequate and ineffective in the particular circumstances of

the case or that there existed special circumstances absolving him or

her from the requirement (cf. Eur. Court HR, Akdivar v. Turkey

judgment, op. cit., para. 68 with further references).

In its judgment in the case of Akdivar v. Turkey, the Court

emphasised that the application of the rule of exhaustion of domestic

remedies must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied

in the context of machinery for the protection of human rights that the

Contracting Parties have agreed to set up (Eur. Court HR, Akdivar v.

Turkey judgment, op. cit. para. 69; Sadik v. Greece judgment, loc.

cit.).

The Commission notes that S. 23 of the Constitutional Court Act

provides for a complaint with the Constitutional Court, alleging an

infringement of constitutional and Convention rights, against decisions

taken by the courts or by administrative authorities. The Commission

considers that, in the light of the wording of this provision and in

the absence of sufficiently relevant precedents in the case-law of the

Constitutional Court, the Government failed to show the existence of

an effective remedy which the applicant ought to have attempted.

It follows that the applicant's complaint about an infringement

of his right to freedom of expression cannot be rejected for non-

exhaustion of domestic remedies.

d. The Government submit that, since the Prince's announcement could

not be equated to a sanction, it did not constitute an interference

with the applicant's rights under Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the

Convention. They further explain that beyond a certain level in the

public service, dissenting from those who are free to appoint, re-

appoint or dismiss high-ranking officials, including (high-ranking)

judges, carries a certain risk, a risk known to all concerned and so

far not regarded as a violation of human rights.

The applicant contends that the Prince's decision constitutes a

sanction for the statements which he made in the course of the lecture

of 16 February 1995. This interference with his right to freedom of

expression could not be justified under paragraph 2 of Article 10

(Art. 10-2).

The Commission finds that the applicant's complaint about a

breach of his right to freedom of expression raises serious issues of

such complexity that they require an examination of the merits. This

part of the application cannot, therefore, be considered manifestly

ill-founded, and there is no other ground on which it could be declared

inadmissible.

2. The applicant further complains under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention that he has no access to a tribunal to

defend his reputation and seek protection of his personal rights,

including his occupation and professional career, against the

statements by the Prince. In this respect, the applicant also invokes,

as a subsidiary means, Article 13, taken in conjunction with Article

10 (Art. 13+10), of the Convention.

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) secures that "[i]n the determination

of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ...

hearing ... by [a] tribunal".

Article 13 (Art. 13) provides that "everyone whose rights and

freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an

effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the

violation has been committed by persons acting in an official

capacity".

According to the Government, the remedies suggested in the

context of its submissions under Article 26 (Art. 26) (Art. of the

Convention provide an effective legal protection for the purposes of

Article 13 (Art. 13).

The applicant disputes the Government's view.

The Commission, having regard to its above considerations under

Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, considers that the present

aspect of the application cannot be declared manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2). Accordingly, it

reserves also this issue for an examination as to its merits.

3. Moreover, the applicant considers that, because of his opinion

regarding a particular legal issue, he is prejudiced in his access to

any public office. He relies on Article 14, taken in conjunction with

Article 10 (Art. 14+10), of the Convention.

According to Article 14 (Art. 14), "the enjoyment of the rights

and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without

discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,

religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,

association with a national minority, property, birth or other status".

The Commission considers that this complaint is closely related

to the applicant's complaint under Article 10 (Art. 10) and that it

must therefore also be declared admissible.

For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the

merits of the case.

H.C. KRÜGER S. TRECHSEL

Secretary President

to the Commission of the Commission