PASCUAL GONZALEZ proti Španělsku

THIRD SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 24265/17
Blanca PASCUAL GONZALEZ
against Spain

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 5 May 2020 as a Committee composed of:

Helen Keller, President,

María Elósegui,

Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges,

and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 24 March 2017,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1. The applicant, Ms Blanca Pascual Gonzalez, is a Spanish national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Hendaye. She was represented before the Court by Ms M.J. Gurruchaga Basurto, a lawyer practising in Donostia.

2. The Spanish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr R.-A. León Cavero, State Attorney.

1. Background of the case

3. The applicant is the widow of V.P.T., allegedly killed by members of the terrorist group Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (“the GAL”) on 8 February 1984 in Hendaye (France). The identity and nationality of the perpetrators were unknown.

4. Since the applicant was a relative of a victim of a violent offence perpetrated by a terrorist group, she was entitled under Spanish law to obtain a compensation payment for her husband’s killing. Pursuant to Law no. 32/1999 of 8 October 1999 on Solidarity with Victims of Terrorism, a lump sum of 23,000,000 pesetas (EUR 138,232.78) was awarded to her and her three daughters.

5. The applicant also received a state aid of 10,000,000 pesetas (EUR 60,022), via her participation at the special draw of national lottery held to help victims of terrorism, regulated by Royal Decree no. 13/1997, of 1 August 1997.

6. According to information available on the website of the Basque Government’s Secretariat for Human Rights, Coexistence and Cooperation[1], the applicant’s husband appears to have been victim of the GAL and, at the same time, member of the terrorist organisation ETA. It does not appear from the file that the applicant objected to her late husband’s publicly recognised membership in ETA before the Basque authorities.

7. The Government submitted that the applicant’s husband had not been arrested by the Spanish authorities prior to his death, either for having escaped to or for hiding in France, and that therefore he could not have been prosecuted and convicted for belonging to ETA. It appears however from the documents submitted by the Government (police reports included in the administrative and judicial proceedings) that the applicant’s husband had been subject to a search and arrest warrant for collaboration with armed groups issued by the central investigating judge no. 2 of the Audiencia Nacional (see paragraph 12 below).

2. Domestic proceedings

8. In 2012 the applicant applied for additional compensation from the State for the death of her husband under Law no. 29/2011 of 22 September 2011 on the Recognition and Comprehensive Protection of Victims of Terrorism. The amount claimed was the amount payable in the event of death (EUR 250,000), less the amount already received under the previous legislation (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above). The claims for this additional compensation were filed with the Ministry of Interior’s General Directorate for Support to Victims of Terrorism following the entry into force of Law no. 29/2011.

9. In 2013 the General Directorate refused to award the applicant the additional compensation claimed, on the basis of Article 3 bis § 2 of Law no. 29/2011 and the European Convention of 24 November 1983 on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, which came into effect in Spain on 1 February 2002 after ratification (see “Relevant domestic law and practice”). It relied on reports produced in 2012 and 2013 by the General Directorate of the Police and the General Directorate of the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), which indicated that the applicant’s husband had been a member of ETA. It therefore concluded that the applicant did not meet the requirements of the current legislation, in particular those set out in Article 8 of the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, which had been directly applicable in the Spanish legal system since its ratification and publication. The provision provided that compensation of victims of violent crimes could be “reduced or refused on account of the victim’s or the applicant’s involvement in organised crime or his membership of an organisation which engages in crimes of violence”.

10. According to the reports produced by the General Directorate of the Police and the General Directorate of the Guardia Civil included in the administrative files, the applicant’s husband had been a “liberated” member of ETA (member who was known to the police, was on ETA’s payroll and worked full-time for ETA), responsible for a commando of “mugalaris” (people who helped others to cross the border between France and Spain).

11. The applicant instituted judicial proceedings (recurso contencioso-administrativo) against the decisions of the Ministry of the Interior.

12. The Audiencia Nacional (Administrative Chamber) dismissed the appeal and upheld the decisions taken by the Ministry of the Interior. The relevant part of the judgment delivered on 24 June 2015 reads as follows:

“SIXTH.- The first additional provision of Law no. 29/2011 deals with “Retroactive application to those who have previously obtained benefits and compensation”, without further specification, providing that “persons who, prior to the enactment of this Law, have received a total aggregate sum for compensation, or have been paid, when applicable, the amounts for civil liability established in a final judicial decision, less than the amount provided for in Annex I of this Law, may request payment of the differences to which they may be entitled, within a year of entry into force of the implementing regulation of the Law.”

In the present case, [the applicant] was awarded compensation for the death of V.P.T., pursuant to Law no. 32/1999 of 8 October on Solidarity with Victims of Terrorism, by means of a decision issued by the Ministry of the Interior of 4 September 2000, which amounted to EUR 138,232.79.

On the other hand, Article 8 § 2 of the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, no. 116, adopted in 1983 by the Council of Europe, reads as follows: “Compensation may also be reduced or refused on account of the victim’s or the applicant’s involvement in organised crime or his membership of an organisation which engages in crimes of violence”.

...

SEVENTH - In the case under consideration, it is noteworthy that the deceased was a member of the terrorist group ETA. In accordance with reports produced by the General Directorate of the Guardia Civil, where it is stated that V.P.T. was “a liberated member of ETA, responsible for a commando of mugalaris” (pages 23 and 24).

Furthermore, in a report of the (...) General Directorate of the Guardia Civil, dated 28 March 2014, which is part of the file, it is stated as follows:

“At the end of 1977 V.P.T. asked C.G.M. to take care of the four members of ETA who formed a commando and whom V.P.T. was hosting at his home. At that time C.G. was a member of ETA dealing with the transfer of commandos of the terrorist group to different places in the Basque Country. C.G. accepted the petition of V.P.T. and the four members of the commando got into the vehicle of the latter, while C.G. and V.P.T. got into the vehicle of G.C., performing the functions of a “reconnaissance vehicle” [a first vehicle which goes ahead to see if a route is safe] to alert the commando in case of police presence on the road. In Salvatierra (Araba/Álava) the members of the commando abandoned the car of V.P.T. (Statement of C.G.M. in Proceedings no. 431, of 5 October 1987, of the Information Provincial Brigade of San Sebastián (Gipuzkoa)).

On 24 July 1978, V.P.T. received a phone call from the member of ETA J.A.I.G., a member of commando MADRID, in which the latter told him that he urgently needed him to receive in Astigarraga, in San Sebastián, the members of the aforementioned commando. V.P.T. went in his private car to the place where the members of the commando MADRID were (...) and took them in his car to France. (Statement of the member of ETA J.A.I. in Proceedings no. 487/81, of 4 February 1981, of the Superior Police Department of Madrid, on the occasion of the dismantling of the MADRID commando. The proceedings were given to the Central Investigating Judge no. 2 of the Audiencia Nacional).

At the end of February 1980 V.P.T. picked up the members of commando MADRID in Rentería (Guipúzkoa), and he hosted them at his home in Oyarzun for a night. The next day the members of the commando moved to France (Statement of J.A.I. in Proceedings no. 487/81, of 4 February 1981, of the Superior Police Department of Madrid, on the occasion of the dismantling of the MADRID commando. The proceedings were given to the Central Investigating Judge no. 2 of the Audiencia Nacional).

On 22 July 1980 he picked up the members of the commando MADRID in Oyarzun (Guipúzkoa), and he hosted them at his home in that village. The members of ETA crossed the Franco-Spanish border heading to France (Statement of J.A.I. in Proceedings no. 487/81, of 4 February 1981, of the Superior Police Department of Madrid, on the occasion of the dismantling of the MADRID commando. The proceedings were given to the Central Investigating Judge no. 2 of the Audiencia Nacional).

On 24 January 1981 he picked up I.E.U. and other members of commando MADRID in Vera de Bidasoa (Navarra) and took them to his homestead [caserío], where they stayed for the night. The next day, V.P.T. took the members of commando MADRID to the parking lot of the supermarket Mamut, in Oyarzun (Guipúzkoa), where they hid inside a truck, whose driver took the members of commando MADRID to Alcobendas (Madrid), so that the latter started a campaign of terrorist attacks in the capital city of Spain (Statements of I.E.U. and J.A. in Proceedings no. 487/81, of 4 February 1981, of the Superior Police Department of Madrid, on the occasion of the dismantling of the MADRID commando. The proceedings were given to the Central Investigating Judge no. 2 of the Audiencia Nacional).

On 10 July 1981, central investigating judge no. 2 of the Audiencia Nacional issued a search and arrest warrant for collaboration with armed groups (Sumario no. 124/81).

On January 1984, he took the members of commando ARABA (...) from Biarritz (France) to the Spanish border, so that the latter could enter Spanish territory to commit terrorist attacks (Statement of J.C.A.A. in Proceedings no. 51/89, of 16 September 1989, of the Information Service of the Guardia Civil of Gipuzkoa, given to the Central Investigating Judge no. 2 of the Audiencia Nacional).

On 8 February 1984 he was killed by gunfire in Hendaya (France), a fact that was attributed to the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación-GAL.

On 27 September 2012, on the occasion of the “Gudari Eguna” (“day of the soldier”), two posters were set in Magdalena Street in Rentería (Guipúzkoa), which included the photographs of six members of ETA who had died due to his criminal activity (...).

...

The second poster included the photographs of the six members of ETA who had died, and among them, that of V.P.T. (...).

The “Gudari Eguna” is a vindication day that is held every year by ETA/KAS/EKIN to pay homage to the members of ETA that have been killed as a consequence of his criminal activity (...).

Finally, V.P.T. is named as an “ETA activist” in volume VI of the encyclopaedia “EUSKADI ETA ASKA TASUNA” (ETA in acronym), published by Txalaparta (a publishing house which is a means of sensitisation for the organizations and structures that make up the supporting infrastructure of ETA).

The publication explains in eight volumes the history of ETA during the years 1952-1992. Volume VI is called “1981-1984 The PSOE arrives” (...).

...

This report, being the result of in-depth research by the security forces of the State, details in an exhaustive way the activities of V.P.T. “P.” as a member of the terrorist group ETA, taking information from the statements of arrested members of ETA given in police investigations and presented to the Audiencia Nacional in the appropriate proceedings.

Even if no credibility was given to the declarations of the detainees, on the grounds that their statements were given to the Guardia Civil or the Police without the necessary safeguards, as maintained by the claimant in her written observations to the said report, without the assistance of a lawyer (an unproven fact), we have at our disposal the sources of the milieu (entorno) of the terrorist group which publicly exhibits V.P.T. “P.” as one of their martyrs, in posters of exaltation and homage to members deceased during his criminal activity, in which he appears next to other deceased members, or even more, his profile as a dead activist is also highlighted in an encyclopaedia edited by people that are part of ETA’s support network.

That is to say, besides the information given by the Guardia Civil and the Police, the terrorist organisation itself recognises V.P.T. as its member. Therefore, all the arguments used by the claimant to deny that fact are unsuccessful.

... in the present proceedings, there is no evidence rebutting the certainty of what is expressed in those documents.

It is to be noted that in Fact no. 4 of the claim the applicant declares that “the reports (those of the General Directorate of the Guardia Civil and the General Directorate of the Police mentioned above) suggest that V.P.T. was killed by the GAL, a terrorist group acting also in Spain”. Nevertheless, those reports also point out that E.G.A. [sic.] was a member of ETA, but the claimant only takes into consideration what benefits her and ignores or refuses what adversely affects her, which from a logical and legal point of view, should be rejected, because without proof of his membership in ETA, it cannot be determined that his death was caused by the armed group GAL, which is the basic factual requirement to be recognised as a victim of terrorism.

This requirement is met where “neither the victim nor the applicant takes part in organised crime or belongs to an organisation which engages in crimes of violence”.

In the present case, and having regard to the foregoing, it has been sufficiently proved that the victim took part and was a member of such an organisation.

Thus, contrary to what has been stated by the applicant that a final judgment is necessary, it should be noted that the perpetration of criminal offences has neither been attributed nor imputed to those responsible for them, in defiance of constitutional safeguards, because the documents examined have not been used as sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction, but merely to meet the necessary factual requirement to grant a benefit or compensation whose scope of application, in accordance with the applicable regulation, is limited to specific conditions, one of which is the victim’s lack of involvement or membership of an organisation devoted to perpetrating violent crimes. This is a question that must unescapably be addressed by the Chamber under the terms set out therein.

This being so, it is easy to understand that the compensation already paid to the applicant was awarded at a time when the European Convention was not applicable in Spain. On the contrary, once the application for compensation has been lodged with the European Convention in force, its application is unavoidable as the positive law applicable to the present case.”

13. During the proceedings before the Audiencia Nacional, the State Attorney submitted additional reports produced by the General Directorate of the Police and the General Directorate of the Guardia Civil referring to supplementary evidence proving the alleged ETA membership of the applicant’s husband. The report referred to the following sources: statements made by other alleged members of ETA to the police when they were arrested, in which they said that the applicant’s husband had been a member of ETA and described his participation in its activities and criminal actions; several publications on the history of ETA (produced by publishing houses allegedly close the organisation) in which the applicant’s husband was named as being a member of the organisation; and articles published by the press. It appears from these reports that the applicant’s husband had allegedly helped several commandos of ETA to move undetected from a safe point to another, that he had also given them shelter in some of his properties, and that in July 1981 the central investigating judge no. 2 of the Audiencia Nacional had issued a search and arrest warrant against him for acts of collaboration with an armed group (see paragraph 12, above).

14. The applicant lodged amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court, invoking a breach of Article 24 § 1 (right to effective protection by the judges and courts) and Article 24 § 2 of the Constitution (right to the presumption of innocence). The applicant relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 6 § 2 of the Convention and the Court’s case-law in respect of those provisions (see, for example, Tendam v. Spain, no. 25720/05, 13 July 2010; and Puig Panella v. Spain, no. 1483/02, 25 April 2006).

15. The Constitutional Court declared the appeal inadmissible owing to the non-existence of a violation of the fundamental rights invoked. The decision was delivered on 5 October 2016 and was served on the applicant on 7 October 2016.

3. Relevant domestic law and practice

16. Concerning the relevant provisions of the Spanish law and practice, the Court refers to cases Larrañaga Arando and Others v. Spain (dec.), no. 73911/16, § 24 - 33, ECHR 2019, and Martínez Agirre and Others v. Spain (dec.), nos. 75529/16 and 79503/16, § 21 - 30, ECHR 2019.

COMPLAINT

17. The applicant complained that the reasons given by the domestic authorities for dismissing her compensation claims under the legislation for victims of terrorism had breached her late husband’s right to be presumed innocent. She stressed that the reasoning used by the domestic authorities had contained a finding that her late husband had been a member of an organisation such as ETA, which constituted a criminal offence under Spanish law. She relied on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

THE LAW

Alleged violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention

18. The applicant complained that the reasons given by the domestic authorities for dismissing her compensation claim under the legislation for victims of terrorism had breached her late husband’s right to be presumed innocent. She relied on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

1. The parties’ submissions

19. The Government observed that the applicants’ late husband had not been subject to any criminal proceedings. His possible criminal responsibility had been extinguished by his death, so he could not be subject to criminal proceedings in the future either. They claimed that there had been no connection between the administrative proceedings concerning the additional compensation claims brought by the applicant and the right of her husband to be presumed innocent in any criminal proceedings. In their view, what had been at stake in the compensation proceedings had been whether the legal requirements to obtain additional compensation for the death of her husband had been met, which included verifying whether the deceased had been a member of ETA and fell under the exception provided by Article 8 of the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes. They contended that in the context of those proceedings, and for the sole purposes of applying Article 8 of that Convention, the reports relied on by the domestic authorities had collected all the existing evidence from different sources (statements made by other ETA members, press news, and publications related to ETA) proving that the deceased had belonged to ETA. They submitted that the proceedings had not required the institution of a criminal proceeding resulting in a criminal conviction against the applicant’s husband. They further argued that it would have been contrary to the sense of justice and to the feelings of ETA’s victims to award the additional compensation claimed by the applicant. The Government therefore invited the Court to conclude that the present application was manifestly ill-founded because it fell outside the subjective and objective scope of application of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, or alternatively, to find that there had been no breach of Article 6 § 2.

20. The applicant argued that Article 6 § 2 could apply to administrative proceedings such as the proceedings at issue in the present case, as the principle of presumption of innocence is not a simple safeguard limited to criminal proceedings, and it requires, inter alia, that no representative of the State or State Authorities declare that a person is guilty before he is proved guilty according to law. In the present case, both the judgement of the Audiencia Nacional and the resolution from the General Directorate for Support to Victims of Terrorism took for granted that the applicant’s husband was guilty, even when the latter had never been formally accused and therefore had never had the opportunity to defend himself. She stressed that the presumption of innocence could only have been rebutted in the context of administrative proceedings on the basis of previous decisions taken by the competent criminal courts following the examination of all the evidence available, and not on mere suspicions contained in police reports. In her view, there was a link between the administrative compensation proceedings and the criminal proceedings, since the former were based on the fact that the applicant’s late husband had committed a crime, a fact for which he had never been either convicted or prosecuted while he was alive.

2. The Court’s assessment

(a) The applicant’s standing

21. The first question to be addressed is whether the applicant has standing as “victim” of the alleged violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Court notes that the applicant is the widow of the late V.P.T., who was allegedly declared guilty of belonging to ETA after his death in the subsequent compensation proceedings brought by the applicants under the Spanish legislation for victims of terrorism. This declaration was allegedly the grounds used by the domestic authorities for not awarding the compensation claimed by the applicant in relation to the killing of her husband. In line with its well-established case-law, the Court considers that the applicant may have a non-pecuniary interest in having her late husband exonerated from any finding of guilt, as well as a pecuniary interest in her capacity as claimant of a right to compensation for his death under the Spanish legislation (see, mutatis mutandis, Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany, 25 August 1987, § 33, Series A no. 123, Vulakh and Others v. Russia, no. 33468/03, §§ 26-28, 10 January 2012, and Demjanjuk v. Germany, no. 24247/15, § 22, 24 January 2019). In these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant may claim to be “victim” of the alleged violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention.

(b) Applicability of Article 6 § 2

(i) General principles

22. Concerning the general principles applicable to the present case, reference is made to the decisions in cases Larrañaga Arando and Others, §§ 40-43, and Martínez Agirre and Others, §§ 38-42, both cited above.

(ii) Application of the general principles to the present case

23. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant’s complaint concerns the dismissal by the domestic authorities of her additional compensation claims for the death of her late husband on the grounds that he had been a member of ETA. In her view, without her late husband having previously been proven guilty of that charge, the domestic authorities’ decisions to refuse compensation, including the reasoning and language used therein, were incompatible with the presumption of innocence. In this connection, the Court considers that what comes into play in the present case is the second aspect of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, the role of which is to prevent the principle of the presumption of innocence from being undermined after the relevant criminal proceedings have ended with an outcome other than a conviction (such as an acquittal, discontinuation of the criminal proceedings as statute-barred, the death of the accused, and so on). The Court’s task is therefore to examine whether there was a link between any prior criminal proceedings that might have existed against her late husband concerning his alleged membership of ETA and the compensation proceedings brought by the applicant. In this context, the Court will examine whether the applicant’s late husband had been “charged with a criminal offence” for the purposes of her complaint under Article 6 § 2. It is not the Court’s role in determining these issues under Article 6 § 2 to take a stand on the applicant’s entitlement to compensation.

24. The Court notes at the outset that the police reports on which the domestic authorities based their findings referred to a previous criminal investigation opened in Spain in connection with the applicant’s husband’s involvement in ETA and its activities and crimes. In particular, the applicant’s husband had been subject to a criminal investigation opened by the Central Investigating Judge no. 2 of the Audiencia Nacional for collaboration with armed groups, in the context of which the latter had issued a search and arrest warrant in 1981 (see paragraph 12 above). It appears that the arrest warrant was not enforced because the applicant’s husband had fled to France, and that he never stood trial in Spain. However, given that this criminal investigation was related to membership of ETA or collaboration in its crimes and activities, the Court is ready to accept that the applicant’s husband had been “charged with a criminal offence” in Spain within the autonomous meaning of this term and in respect of the criminal charge for which the applicant claimed the protection of the presumption of innocence.

25. The Court further observes that although the parties have not submitted any information on the formal discontinuation of that investigation or proceedings, the applicant’s husband was killed in 1984 and his possible criminal liability was extinguished by his death, as admitted by the Government. The Court therefore assumes that the criminal proceedings against the applicant’ late husband were discontinued as a result of his death (compare Vulakh and Others v. Russia, no. 33468/03, §§ 8 and 33, 10 January 2012, and Demjanjuk v. Germany, no. 24247/15, § 9, 24 January 2019).

26. The Court’s task at this stage of its analysis is to examine whether there was a link between the discontinued criminal proceedings against the applicant’s late husband and the compensation proceedings brought by the applicant for his killing, having regard to the general considerations set out above (see Larrañaga Arando and Others, § 43, and Martínez Agirre and Others, § 41, both cited above). In this connection, the Court observes that the compensation proceedings brought under Law no. 29/2011 were administrative in nature and aimed at determining whether the applicant had a right to obtain additional compensation from the State for the killing of her husband by terrorist groups in 1984. The subject matter of those proceedings was legally and factually different from that of the criminal proceedings or investigations instituted against her husband prior to his death for alleged participation or collaboration with ETA.

27. The Court notes that in the present case the Ministry of the Interior and the courts in the judicial proceedings were not required under Law no. 29/2011, in order to examine whether the applicants should be awarded compensation, to have regard to the contents or the outcome of the previous criminal proceedings. While the police reports on which the domestic authorities relied contained some references to the previous criminal investigations concerning the applicant’s late husband for alleged involvement or participation in ETA activities (see paragraphs 7, 10 and 12 above), these were not the only elements taken into account for establishing that the latter had been a member of ETA. The police reports also relied on non-official publications allegedly close to the organisation in which the individual concerned was named as being a member of ETA, as well as on statements made by other alleged members of the organisation. Therefore, it does not appear that the contents or the outcome of those previous criminal investigations against the applicant’s husband were decisive for the impugned proceedings.

28. In any event, the Court notes that the Ministry of the Interior and the Audiencia Nacional did not engage in a review or evaluation of the concrete evidence included in the criminal file against the applicant’s husband. Nor did they analyse the decisions taken by the investigating authorities in those proceedings or reassess the applicant’s husband’s participation in the events leading to the criminal charges at issue. The domestic courts limited themselves to taking into account, among other elements, the previous criminal investigation instituted against the applicant’s husband as mentioned in the police reports. The Court also takes note of the Government’s argument that that investigation could not have led to a prosecution or conviction in Spain prior to his death owing to the fact that he had fled to France.

29. Lastly, the Court notes that the Audiencia Nacional stated in its judgment of 24 June 2015 that the purpose of the compensation proceedings had been to determine whether the applicant had a right to compensation in accordance with the applicable regulations concerning victims of terrorism, which provided an exception where the alleged victims had been members of an organisation devoted to perpetrating violent crimes. It explicitly distinguished this issue from the question of criminal liability of the applicant’s husband, which was not a matter for examination in the context of the compensation proceedings. The Court accepts that the rules of evidence and the burden of proof before administrative courts may be different from those applicable in the context of criminal proceedings.

(iii) Conclusion

30. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of the necessary link between the discontinued criminal proceedings against her husband and the compensation proceedings brought by her (see, mutatis mutandis, Kaiser v. Austria (dec.), no. 15706/08, 13 December 2016; and Martínez Agirre and Others, § 52, cited above). It follows that Article 6 § 2 was not applicable to the latter proceedings. Accordingly, the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be declared inadmissible in application of Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 28 May 2020.

Olga Chernishova Helen Keller
Deputy Registrar President

[1] http://www.euskadi.eus/web01-apvictim/es/o11aConsultaWar/victima?locale=es (last accessed on 17 March 2020).